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LEGAL EDUCATION: NEMESIS OR
ALLY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS?©
By JANET E. MOSHER*

There is much in legal education which contributes to
lawyering practices that are fundamentally at odds with
the formation of social movements. These practices
include the "individualization" of client problems; the
reshaping of the realities of clients' lives into legal
categories or boxes; the commitment to
instrumentalism (that is, to securing a favourable legal
result); and lawyer domination and control and the
correlates of client silence and passivity. The genesis
for these features of dominant lawyering practices can
be traced, at least in part, to legal education. More
specifically, legal education's emphasis upon doctrinal
analysis, its tendency to trade upon an existing stock of
legal categories or stories, and the relative inattention
paid to fundamental critiques of the status quo
contribute to these lawyering practices.

L'ducation juridique, sous plusicurs aspects, contribue
A forger des pratiques du droit qui sont
fondamentalement oppos6s A la formation de
Ces pratiques incluent
mouvements sociaux.
id'individualisation> des probl~mes des clients; le
fagonnement des v6cus des clients de mani6re Ales
faire entrer dans des cat6gories juridiques;
rengagement envers l'instrumentalisme (e'est-A-dire
l'obtention d'un rdsultat favorable); ainsi que la
domination et le contr61e des avocats auxquels sont
relids le silene et la passivit6 des clients. L'origine de
ces pratiques du droit remonte, du moins en partie, A
l'ducation juridique. L'emphase que celle-ci met sur
l'analyse doctrinale, sa tendance A abuser des
cat6gories juridiques existantes et l'inattention relative
qu'elle porte aux critiques fondamentales du statu quo
contribuent a maintenir de telles pratiques.

As part of these anniversary celebrations, the conference
organizers asked that I address the question of whether law schools have
responded to social movements. Given the nature of the celebration
under way, and more particularly the title of this panel, "The
Transformative Potential of Clinical Legal Education," I also
understood my task to include speaking to the role that clinical
education plays, or might play, in facilitating the responsiveness of law
schools to social movements.
Before I begin to answer these questions it is important to
unpack certain assumptions embedded within the question of "whether
law schools have responded to social movements?" Implicit in the
question are the assumptions that law schools, and thus law, can respond
(that law can be called to the aid of social movements) and that law
schools ought to respond. I also want to suggest that underlying these
© 1997, J.E. Mosher.
* Associate Professor of Law and Social Work, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. This
paper was originally presented at Parkdale Community Legal Clinic's twentieth anniversary
symposium in September 1991, as part of a panel on "The Transformative Potential of Clinical
Legal Education."

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 35 NO. 3

assumptions is a compelling normative vision of lawyering which is
fundamentally at odds with the vision which currently pervades legal
education.
In what follows, I argue that responsiveness to social movements
ought to be measured by reference to the extent to which a law school
systematically produces lawyers with the skill, knowledge, and ability to
work with members of subordinated communities, and with the
movements of which they are a part, in ways that facilitate social
transformation. Without having engaged in an extensive empirical
investigation to answer this question, I do think that I am on safe ground
in concluding that no Canadian law school can persuasively claim to
have accomplished this, nor even to have made many major steps in this
direction. Indeed, I doubt that any Canadian law school has
self-consciously undertaken such an enterprise as part of its "mission."
In coming to this conclusion I rely upon two bodies of literature: that
which assesses the impact of current poverty law practices; and that
which describes and critiques the current state of legal education.
The insights from this literature suggest that law schools transmit
a vision of practice-a vision later manifested in the practice of their
graduates-which is not only unresponsive to social movements, but
which in fact undermines their very existence. As such, it is a vision of
lawyering that fails to assist subordinated people in any meaningful way.
This critique ought not, however, to lead one to give in to despair (a
despair that is rather pervasive in some circles) about the potential of
law and lawyering to facilitate social transformation. To the contrary,
the critique contains the outlines of a vision of an alternative mode of
lawyering, and of practices which facilitate, rather than impede, social
movements. The shift from lawyering that truncates, to lawyering that
empowers, occurs when the emphasis of lawyering practices shifts from
outcome to process; from getting to becoming; from instrumentalism to
empowerment.
In many respects my article, like Professor Lucie White's, argues
that there is much in the existing practices of many progressive lawyers
which is deeply troubling. I attempt to document what I see some of
those troubles to be, and to explore their relationship to legal education.
Professor White has aptly turned the question of the transformative
potential of clinical legal education on its head, to ask about the
potential of clinicians and clinical legal educators to transform
themselves and their practices, "so as to open those practices to the
knowledge, the power, and human agency of the people with whom we
work?" I think it appropriate to extend the audience to whom this
challenge is directed, to include all those who engage in the practice or
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teaching of law with the hope of improving the lives of the marginalized
and oppressed. This would obviously include those practitioners who
self-consciously engage in a process of lawyering for social change,
undertaking explicitly politicized practices, but would also include those
who assist individuals in the securement of their legal rights and
entitlements; to obtain for them what various social institutions formally
proclaim is theirs, yet fail to yield up voluntarily. The net might be cast
more widely still, to include all those lawyers who envision themselves as
champions of justice, rather than as instrumental maximizers of private
rights and profits, because part of what is at issue here is whether
lawyers ought to be the privileged guardians of justice which they are
now.
What is it then that these lawyers do? This question could be
answered on at least two levels; the first I will describe and leave, for it is
the second which is most relevant to my inquiry. At one level, these
lawyers do what Professor White has described: they secure rights and
entitlements; they organize communities; they lobby for progressive
legislative change; and/or they seek systemic reform through test-case
litigation. These outcomes, though always intended by the lawyers
seeking and securing them to be beneficial, are not always so in fact.1
The harms worked here are of two sorts: harms to individual clients
because the legal "remedies," much to the surprise of the well-intended
lawyers securing them, on occasion actually worsen clients' situations;
and the systemic harm of daily and routinely turning to existing social
structures and institutions demanding, and more importantly assuming,
that justice will be dispensed.
The second level at which one might talk about what it is that
lawyers do, is to focus not upon outcomes, but rather upon the process
of lawyering itself. It is here that my inquiry is focused. The description
of the lawyering process which I offer below is painted in broad-brushed
strokes, focusing upon several of what I take to be its pervasive
characteristics.2 The analysis which accompanies this description
suggests that, in our role as lawyers, as "representatives" of our clients or
1 See G.P. LUpez, "The Lives We Know So Little About" (1989) 42 Stan. L Rev. 1.
2 Some of the characteristics which I identify Anthony Alfieri has described as "habits of
perception." See A.V. Alfieri, "The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic
Empowerment" (1988) 16 N.Y.U. Rev. L & Soc. Change 659 at 663 [hereinafter "Antimonies of
Poverty Law"].
Lawyers might consider taking up the challenge which Alfieri posed at the Parkdale
anniversary conference-to go back through your files and examine how frequently these "habits of
perception" are present in your work and in particular, to search for moments when you have
actively suppressed client narrative or utilized other methods of lawyer control and domination.

616

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 35 NO. 3

as "advocates" on behalf of the poor or other marginalized groups, we
engage in practices (practices which are at the core of, are indeed
constitutive of, our professional identity) which undermine progressive
social change. Progressive social change is undermined because lawyers
routinely and actively suppress the voice and agency of the persons they
purport to "represent." For decades lawyers have purported to know
what it is that their marginalized clients need (they have frequently been
authoritative arbiters of such needs) and while they have engaged in
zealous efforts to satisfy those needs, they have done so in a manner
which includes the "client" as at best a marginal player, but more
commonly as an observer or mere object of the lawyering efforts. That
such a charge should be levied against lawyers is not at all surprising
given the current socio-historical context in which Enlightenment claims
of universality, objectivity, and neutrality are being increasingly
challenged by voices from the margins. One can no longer purport
unproblematically to identify and speak on behalf of the needs of others.
Nor, in the context of multiple discourses of what justice requires, can
lawyers-largely white and middle class-continue to regard themselves
as its sole (or privileged) champions.
As indicated earlier, the description of lawyering which follows is
drawn with broad-brush strokes. However, it is important to add at the
outset a few more subtle, nuanced strokes to ensure that the general
description is not mistaken for the whole. There are lawyers who strive
in their daily practices to subvert these characteristic features of
lawyering. These lawyers have already identified aspects of the
"traditional" lawyering process to be harmful to their clients, and have
worked to change their methods of practice. 3 Of these lawyers, some are
clinical legal educators, who have changed not only their personal style
of practice, but have attempted to impart these lessons to their students.
But the challenges of doing so are enormous, particularly given students'
exposure to the mainstream curriculum of legal education and the
lessons about lawyering which it communicates.
In the main, lawyering is about the provision of legal services to
individual clients on a case-by-case basis. "Individualization" describes
aptly not only the formal delivery of legal services, but also the
conceptualization of client problems. Problems facing any given client
are assessed and understood within a context whose outermost
boundaries are those drawn by the particular client's life. Broadening
the context to question whether others share a similar problem, or to
3 In Ontario, such lawyers are most likely to be found in community legal clinics, such as
Parkdale Community Legal Services.
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include an assessment of social, economic, or political structures, is
beyond the reach of most lawyering. Problems belong to clients; they
are possessions, like the clothing on their backs.
Problems which clients present to lawyers are quickly
conceptualized and categorized as "legal" problems. Avenues open for
the resolution of any given problem thus, not surprisingly, appear to lie
within the boundaries of the legal system. In practice, lawyers routinely
deny-or perhaps it is more appropriate to say, rarely advert to-the
possibility of non-legal forms of action and remedies. Thus, the lawyer's
world is professionally centred and dominated; some might say myopic.
Part and parcel of this tendency of lawyers to look to the law and the
legal system is the belief that legal remedies are both attainable and
efficacious. 4
A third feature of lawyering is its commitment to
instrumentalism. Perhaps precisely because lawyers believe in the
efficacy of legal remedies, their practices are dictated by efforts to obtain
them. Within this outcome orientation (wherein the world of possible
outcomes is circumscribed by the notoriously narrow range of judicial
remedies), "success" is understood to be the securement of a favourable
legal result.S This is true both of individual client representation and of
instances of "interest group" representation, wherein groups seeking
social change have optimistically (but often unrealistically) presupposed
that the securement of a favourable judicial result would lead to
substantial change in the lives of their members.
An important offshoot of this belief in the efficacy of legal
technique and legal remedies is that it privileges lawyer know-how, and
thus justifies lawyer dominance and its correlate of client silence. 6
Because the problem is categorized as "legal," and the available avenues
4 Alfieri, in "Antimonies of Poverty Law," supra note 2 at 671-72, has described this belief in
the efficacy of legal remedies as one of the core myths at the centre of lawyering.

5 The prevalence within the profession of an ethic of partisanship reinforces and perpetuates
this instrumentalism. For a description and critique of this ethic see, for example, D.L. Rhode,
"Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice" (1985) 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589; and D. Luban, Lanyers and
Justice:An EthicalStudy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).
6 Alfieri's work on the silencing of client narratives is instructive. See "Antimonies of
Poverty," supra note 2; A.V. Alfieri, "Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of
Client Narrative" (1991) 100 Yale LJ.2107 [hereinafter "Reconstructive Poverty Law"]; "Speaking
Out of Turn: The Story of Josephine V." (1991) 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 619 [hereinafter "Speaking
Out"]; "The Politics of Clinical Knowledge" (1990) 35 N.Y.L. Sch. L Rev. 7. See also M. Spiegel,
"Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession" (1979) 128 U.

Pa. L. Rev. 41, who notes the lack of consensus regarding which decisions are appropriately those of
the "client" and who argues for the application of the law of informed consent to the lawyer/client

relationship.
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of redress or resolution are to be.found within the legal system, it seems
axiomatic that lawyers ought to be the predominant problem solvers.
Notwithstanding the law of .agency which ascribes to the "client" the
legal status of principal, and to the lawyer that of agent, and
notwithstanding the rhetoric in codes of professional conduct that
position the client as the person in control of the relationship, often it is
the lawyer who dominates and controls.7 This control is often exercised

through manipulation and coercion and justified by paternalistic
assertions that lawyers know what is best for their clients. Thus,
paternalism is justified by reference to outcome-another indication of
the instrumentalism which characterizes the practice of law. Of course,

what often goes unstated in this assertion is its necessary implication that
clients do not know, and are unable to protect or promote, their needs
and interests. 8
In part, the client is understood to be incompetent because of
the elevated status accorded to legal knowledge and to lawyering.
Clients cannot possibly be given responsibility for important decisions
relating to the legal process, for they simply do not-and

7

Stephen Ellman explains the tendency towards lawyer control in the following way:
[a]ttorneys, after all, wield technical expertise, enjoy exclusive or privileged access both to
other lawyers and to officials of the state, and bring familiarity and detachment to
situations in which clients are often frightened, angry, and uninitiated. Often social status
and economic class will also give lawyers a standing to which both lawyer and client may
feel deference is due. Even lawyers not eager to embrace class privilege may accept
traditions and habits of professional autonomy which restrict the spheres of client
decisionmaking and active involvement. All of these factors encourage lawyers to
assume, and clients to cede, a major role not only in the implementation of client choices
but in the making of the choices themselves.
S. Ellman, "Lawyers and Clients" (1987) 34 UCLA L. Rev. 717 at 718. See also "Speaking
Out," supra note 6; R. Wasserstrom, "Lawyers as Professional: Some Moral Issues" (1975) 5 Hum.
Rts. 1; and S. Sarat, "Lawyers and Clients: Putting Professional Service on the Agenda of Legal
Education" (1991) 41 J. Legal. Educ. 43.
8 See D. Luban, "Paternalism and the Legal Profession" [1981] Wis. L Rev. 454, especially at
458-59, wherein he argues that lawyers frequently manipulate a case or client for what the lawyer
takes to be the client's own good.
Alfieri also argues that traditional practices of lawyering are tied to the notion of client
helplessness: see Alfieri references, supra note 6. As part of a project in which I was involved to
develop curricula on wife abuse for law schools in Ontario, I wrote to a number of groups and
individuals who provide shelter, support, and/or advocacy to abused women inviting their input into
the curriculum. Basically, I asked them what law schools ought to be teaching future lawyers. The
responses which I received detailed a number of complaints about lawyering practices. One of the
most common complaints was that lawyers all too frequently assume their abused women clients to
be incompetent and attempt to control and manipulate them.
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cannot-understand the nuances and complexities of law and lawyering.9
Not only are clients seen to have little to contribute to decisions made in
the lawyering process but their interventions are frequently thought to
potentially jeopardize the securement of the legal remedy around which
the lawyer's strategies are constructed.1 0 Thus, clients are often seen as
having very little to contribute to their own cases.l/ Lawyers purport to
know what it is that their clients need (and as suggested this "need"
usually takes the form of some sort of legal remedy) and act on their
clients' behalf (not in concert with them) in an attempt to ensure such
needs or interests are satisfied. Lawyers position themselves as
actors-the doers-and position their clients as the beneficiaries of the
bestowal of their expertise. 12
Before embarking on the analysis of why these aspects of
lawyering are troubling, it is necessary first to set forth a theory of how it
is that progressive social change comes about, since as suggested earlier,
this is what I maintain is undermined by these lawyering practices.
"Social movements" are a form of expression by a group of
people who share a common oppression of their refusal to live with that
oppression. Allies of oppressed persons sometimes join in these
struggles, but there is often good reason for social movement actors to

9 This argument resonates with those made by the legal profession regarding the need for the
profession to be self-regulating. Like other professionals, lawyers see themselves as possessors of
expertise, a possession which they and others believe entitles them to an elevated and protected
status. Lawyers, individually and as a profession, anxiously guard their professional turf from
encroachment by non-experts (be they paralegals or their own clients).
10 See "Reconstructive Poverty Law," supra note 6 at 2129-30; and L.E. White,
"Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G."
(1990) 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1.
11 This process of privileging lawyer know-how and viewpoint is well developed and explained
in work of Alfieri. See references supra note 6.
12 Many parallels can be drawn usefully here between law and medicine. So, for example,
there is a wealth of literature which critiques the tendency of medical practitioners to organize
knowledge into categories of organic disease; to assume that patients are not valuable or reliable
sources of information and to thus rely upon technological diagnostic measures; to assume that
solutions to patients' medial problems reside in the correct bio-medical response (as opposed, for
instance, to residing in safer and healthier communities, etc.); to "medicalize" social problems (to
assume that they are medical in origin and that they are best addressed through medical responses)
and to assume that they know what is in the best interests of the "patient" and to take charge of the
relationship. This latter assumption has, in recent years, been fundamentally challenged, including
through the development, at law, of the doctrine of informed consent. It is quite striking to
compare the wealth of literature addressing the day-to-day interactions of physicians and their
"patients" and in particular, the literature on "patient autonomy," to the dearth of such literature
on the day-to-day interactions of lawyers and their "clients," on securing client autonomy in the
lawyer-client relationship, or more broadly, on the role of power in the lawyer-client relationship.
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be suspicious of these self-proclaimed allies.1 3 Though social
movements are expressions of collectives, the "conscientization" of
individuals is critical to social movement formation. 14 Conscientization
refers to the process of developing a critical consciousness of one's life
situation. Thus, conscientization entails reflection upon social,
economic, political, and legal structures, and upon distributions of
resources and power. Social movements emerge when individuals with
evolving critical consciousness come to see that, not only are the harms
which they endure shared by others, but that the source of the harm is
structural, not individual, in origin. Critical consciousness breeds
action(s) to end oppression through the fundamental transformation of
the social, economic and/or political conditions which permit and
perpetuate that oppression. Social movements are, fundamentally, a
challenge to the existing order and to the label of "just," which, through
an act of self-ingratiation, that order has bestowed upon itself.
This understanding of social movements is linked to a particular
understanding of how the social change necessary to end oppression
occurs. In this vision of social change, oppressed people who have
developed critical consciousness come together to act upon the world in
order to transform it. It is through the dialectical relationship of critical
consciousness and action that social change occurs. People, not
governments or states, are the agents of change. In this understanding
of social change, law is important for at least two reasons. First, as a
primary mechanism through which the existing order is reproduced and
its justness proclaimed, the law is an object for critical reflection about
power and justice-a site of contestation. The dialectical relationship of
theory and practice also means that the law is an object which itself must

13

As argued in the text, many lawyers who commit their practice lives to working on behalf of
the oppressed routinely deny client agency. This is evidence in itself of the need to be sceptical
about self-proclaimed allies. Paulo Freire's more general remarks about members of the oppressor
group who seek to ally themselves with the oppressed are apt:
They almost always bring with them the marks of their origin: their prejudices and their
deformations, which include a lack of confidence in the people's ability to think, to want,
and to know.... Those who authentically commit themselves to the people must reexamine themselves constantly. ... The convert who approaches the people but feels
alarm at each step they take, each doubt they express and each suggestion they offer, and
attempts to impose his "status," remains nostalgic towards his origin.
P. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, rev. ed., trans. M. Bergman Ramos (New York:
Continuum, 1989) at 42-43.
14 This understanding of social movements, and of social change, draws upon the work of
Freire, ibid., and upon the Latin American literature of the "new legal services." See, for example,
F. Rojas, "A Comparison of Change-Oriented Legal Services in Latin America With Legal Services
in North America and Europe" (1988) 16 Int'l J. Soc. L. 203 at 206 and 210.
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be transformed through action. Second, the law can be, on occasion,
utilized instrumentally as a strategic resource in concrete struggles for
particular change.1S
In an individualized, case-by-case approach to lawyering, harms
are largely understood to be individual and private; not shared and
social. Because problems are understood as individual in nature-as
aberrations in an otherwise just social and legal order-that order goes
unchallenged. The active critical stance essential to social movements
not only fails to materialize, but is actively suppressed, in the lawyering
process. The lawyering process tends to be decidedly anti-critical.
Moreover, the manner in which legal services are
organized-individual and case-by-case-creates few opportunities for
the sort of collectivization of experience which could permit insights into
the structural roots of client suffering. 16 And the failure to collectivize
experience means that the development of a critical stance towards the
existing order is unlikely to occur. Thus, both the content and structure
of the lawyering process run contrary to the objectives of social
movements which seek to challenge and displace existing structures and
discourses through the emergence of critical consciousness and the
creation of alternative, competing discourses.
One discourse, in particular, which is frequently challenged and
contested by social movements is needs discourse. As Nancy Fraser
argues,

15 This understanding of social change can be juxtaposed against an alternative and pervasive
theory of social change, wherein change is seen to emanate from favourable judicial and legislative
decisions and in which the primary agents of change are thought to be lawyers, judges, and

politicians. While it is beyond the scope of this article to develop this analysis in depth, my premise
is that this "top-down" version of social change has been demonstrated time and again to be

ineffectual.
16 Legal services can be organized in more collectivized ways, as experience from "new legal

services" (see supra note 14) providers in Latin America illustrates. For example, Casa de Ia Mujer
in Bogota has a multi-disciplinary staff whose aim it is to develop, through the process of popular
education, the consciousness of women in terms of gender with a goal to raising their awareness and
their self-esteem. The office will not initiate a legal process for a woman who comes for legal

assistance until she has participated in two workshops. The participants in the workshops include
other women who have experienced a similar problem, a lawyer, and perhaps a psychologist. In the
first workshop, the women reflect critically upon the concept of women's rights in terms of their
benefits and limitations. The second focuses upon women's position in society, attempting to
identify the power structures at play and to articulate the larger structural changes which must come

about if women's lives are to be enhanced. As part of these workshops, women also plan mutual
and self-help strategies. These workshops seek to accomplish two purposes: to assist individual
women in deciding what action to take to address her current situation; and to create a critical mass
of women who are empowerd to change the world around them.
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needs-talk appears as a site of struggle where groups with unequal discursive (and
nondiscursive) resources compete to establish as hegemonic their respective
interpretations of legitimate social needs. ... [N]eeds become politicized when, for
example, women, workers and/or peoples of color come to contest the subordinate
identities and roles, the traditional, reified, and disadvantageous need interpretations
previously assigned to and/or embraced by them. By insisting on speaking publicly of
heretofore depoliticized needs, by claiming for these needs the status of legitimate
political issues, such persons and groups do several things ... . First, they contest the
established boundaries separating "politics" from "economics" and "domestics." Second,
they offer alternative interpretations of their needs embedded in alternative chains of
in-order-to relations. Third, they create new discourse publics from which they try to
disseminate their interpretations of their needs throughout a wide range of different
discourse publics. Finally, they challenge, modify, and/or displace hegemonic elements of
the means of interpretation and communication; they invent new forms of discourse for
17
interpreting their needs.

Lawyers routinely take for granted what it is that clients need,
proceeding as though the needs of the poor and other marginalized
groups are uncontested and uncontestable. Client needs are, as
suggested earlier, packaged into existing categories of legal causes of
action and remedies; that is, repackaged into the form of expert needs
discourse.
As a result, the need is decontextualized and recontextualized ..., [and] the people whose
needs are in question are repositioned. They become individual "cases" rather than
members of social groups or participants in political movements. In addition, they are
rendered passive, positioned as potential recipients of predefined services rather than as
agents involved in interpreting their needs and shaping their life conditions.

17 N. Fraser, "Talking about Needs: Interpretive Contests as Political Conflicts in
Welfare-State Societies" [1989] 99 Ethics 291 at 296 and 303.
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this administrative rhetoric, expert needs discourses, too, tend to be
By virtue of 18
depoliticizing.

By characterizing client problems as legal (and thus denying the
efficacy of non-legal responses and solutions), and by denying the
possibility of client understanding of the legal world, lawyers effectively
render clients as passive observers of their own lives. 19 The denial of
client agency sends a message to clients that they lack the ability to name
their needs, to contest what have been assumed to be their needs, to
contest what it is that "justice" requires, or to take action themselves. 20
18

1bid. at 306-07. Fraser develops the example of the role of shelters for abused women,
which offers, in my view, many parallels to the critique of legal services. The earliest shelters were
based upon an understanding of abuse as a social, not an individual, problem requiring a dramatic
redistribution of social power and resources to eradicate it. Moreover, shelters were integrally
connected to a social movement-the battered women's movement. Consciousness-raising and
women-helping-women were its methods. Increasingly, as shelters became dependent upon the
state for funding, they became more professionalized (services delivered by "professionals"),
individualized (individual battered women were offered therapy and treatment), and depoliticized.
Similar arguments, in the Canadian context, have been developed by N.Z Hilton, "One in Ten: The
Struggle and Disempowerment of the Battered Women's Movement" (1989) 7 Can. J. Fam. L 313;
and by G. Walker, Family Violence and the Women's Movement: The ConceptualPolitics of Struggle
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).
As Fraser points out, at 294, there is a further issue as to whether "socially authorized forms of
public discourse [here legal discourse] ... are skewed in favor of the self-interpretation and interests
of dominant social groups ... ." Here, one need only think about who has participated historically in
the shaping of legal categories, causes of action and remedies, and the frequency with which "novel"
litigants are forced to defend motions for the failure to disclose a "reasonable cause of action," to
be firmly persuaded that legal discourse is skewed in favour of the interests of dominant social
groups. This no doubt helps to explain why, in some instances, the securement of the legal
"remedy" brings, as noted earlier, more harm than good. See the discussion infra note 30 and
accompanying text regarding the use of categories.
For cases where the claims of novel litigants have been challenged see, for example, Hunt v.
Carey CanadaInc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959; Doe v. MetropolitanToronto (Municipality)Commissioners of
Police (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 225 (Ont. Div. Ct.), aff'g 58 D.LR. (4th) 396 (Ont. H.C.J.); and Finlay v.
Canada (Finance), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607.
19
As Alfieri has pointed out in his work, the denial of client agency arises in large measure
because of the lawyer's focus upon outcome and not upon process. He notes in "Reconstructive
Poverty Law," supra note 6 at 2146-47:
Even when the advocacy is vigorous and well-intentioned ..., there is a cost. The cost is
paid for by the lawyer's purchase of the client's story, and with it, her voice and narrative.
This is the historical price of poverty law, the image of the unspeaking client. The legacy
of winning is client powerlessness.
20
As Martha Minow has argued, "claims to speak for others by people not in the group are
vulnerable on the grounds that participation itself is a value and the process of representing a
viewpoint is an exercise of power that should be enjoyed by those on whose behalf the exercise is
claimed": M. Minow, "From Class Actions to Miss Saigon: The Concept of Representation in the
Law" (1991) 39 Clev. St. L Rev. 269 at 286.
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In sum, the process of lawyering actively works against the creation of
counter-hegemonic discourses about needs, and about justice, and
contradicts a fundamental premise of social movements-confidence in
the ability of the oppressed to name, and to take action to change, the
unjust order which shapes their everyday realities.
But to what extent can we peg the blame for these practices on
legal education? While other confounding variables are no doubt at
play, a brief walk through current legal education will, I believe, reveal
legal education as making a significant and enduring contribution to
these practices.
The core of legal education continues to be the appellate court
decision, and learning to analyze these decisions continues to be legal
education's central (though not exclusive) preoccupation. While no
doubt an important skill, its central role in the curriculum is disturbing
for a number of reasons, relating both to what is expressly excluded, and
what is communicated both explicitly and implicitly by it21
A central message communicated through the study of appellate
court decisions is that lawyering entails the rational application of law to
facts (neutral technique), in a world where facts are "found" (not
contested), the law is given and applied, and concrete, legitimate results
are produced.2 2 This central message of legal education is arguably the
precursor of many of the deleterious practices observed earlier.
First, doctrinal analysis routinely obscures the reality that both
facts and law are deeply ambiguous. A consequence of this reality is that
relevant questions about the role of values, emotions, and political
choice-in both legal process and substantive outcomes-are rarely
posed. Serious attempts to uncover and critique the social, economic,
and political conditions underpinning legal doctrine, legal process, and

21 Several authors have observed that much of what students learn in law school, they learn
through the messages about law and lawyering implicit in the formal curriculum and its delivery.
This observation and its implications are thoughtfully developed in an article by Howard Lesnick:
"Infinity in a Grain of Sand: The World of Law and Lawyering As Portrayed in the Clinical
Teaching Implicit in the Law School Curriculum" (1990) 37 UCLA L Rev. 1157.
Karl Kare has labelled these implicit messages "the hidden curriculum." These messages, he
argues, are "contained in the instructional methods, the emotional setting of the classroom, and the
social hierarchy of the law school, and in the array of course offerings and requirements, the
sequencing and pacing of courses, and indeed in the overall structure of the formal curriculum":
K.E. Kare, "The aw School Curriculum in the 1980s: What's Left?" (1982) 32 J.Legal Educ. 336
at 336.
22 See Kare, supra note 21 at 339-40, Lesnick, supra note 20; and G.P. L6pez, "Training
Future Lawyers to Work With the Politically and Socially Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal
Education" (1989) 91 W. Va. L Rev. 305 [hereinafter "Training Future Lawyers"].
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particular legal results are largely absent. 2 3 Thus, much of legal
education simply accepts existing social, political, and economic
arrangements as givens-neither open to, nor worthy of, serious
consideration and critique. In doing so, legal education communicates
to students that, as lawyers, their role is not to seek substantive change
to the existing order, but to get what they can for their clients within that
order.
The central place of doctrinal analysis in legal education is
consistent with what many have maintained is the primary purpose of
legal education-to legitimize and reproduce the status quo.2 4 In this
view, doctrinal analysis is but one device through which legal educators,
both consciously and unconsciously, legitimate the existing social,
23 Here too, a number of authors have commented on the absence of critique in legal
education. With respect to Canadian legal education Jamie Cassels and Maureen Mahoney have
observed that, "despite many good intentions and limited reforms, Canadian legal education has
always perpetrated attitudes and practices hostile to legal critique and social transformation":
"Critical Legal Education: Paralysis with a Purpose": (1989) 4 Can. J. L & Soe'y 99 at 100. In this
respect, an article by Stephen Halpern is revealing. Halpern was a political science professor who
returned to school to complete the first year of law. He comments upon his experience as follows:
The case method teaches the student to think of law primarily in terms of how different
legal rules are applied in varying factual circumstances. It hampers and discourages
students from placing the issues raised in the cases into a social context which transcends
particular disputes or the rules which purportedly explain why the cases were resolved as
they were. ... It structures a student's thinking so as to ignore the extent to which cases
and legal rules reflect underlying patterns of social conflict or organization or the
distribution of power in society. The relationship between the case law and the social
structure in which it operates is tacitly excluded from any serious and systematic
consideration. The cases and the law itself are divorced from social realities....
The first-year student studies contract, property, torts, and constitutional law and finds
virtually no attention given to the role of social class, political power, distribution of
wealth, and their respective influences on the substantive law in those fields....
Students learn, as they read and discuss the "issues" in the cases, that questions of social
justice are largely irrelevant to the study or practice of law. This is beyond peradventure
one of the most notable, if dubious, achievements of American legal education. It first
deadens the sense of social consciousness in the law student and then imposes a proper
professional, largely apolitical, consciousness in its place:
S. Halpern, "On the Politics and Pathology of Legal Education (Or, Whatever Happened to
That Blindfolded Lady With the Scales?)" (1982) 32 J. Legal Educ. 383 at 384, 385, and 387. See
also "Training Future Lawyers," supra note 22; and Klare, supra note 21, both observing that legal
educators spend little time on the political and economic theories underlying legal arrangements.
24 Cassels & Mahoney, supranote 23 at 101, argue that "a primary function of legal education
has been to produce legal workers in a manner consistent with existing structures of privilege." In
coming to this conclusion they rely, in part, upon Blaine Baker's historical work on the Law Society
of Upper Canada. See, for example, G.B. Baker, "'So Elegant A Web': Providential Order and the
Rule of Law in Early Nineteenth-Century Upper Canada" (1988) 38 U.T.L.J. 184. See also Klare,
supra note 21; Halpern, supra note 23; and N. Redlich, "Clinical Education: Stranger in an Elitist
Club" (1981) 31 J. Legal Educ. 201. This theme was also developed by a number of speakers who
participated in Parkdale's twentieth anniversary conference.
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political, legal, and economic order. Other devices include the
socialization process of the law school experience 25 and the direct
admonition of radical lawyering. In this latter regard, consider for
example the remarks made by Mr. Justice George Finlayson to young
lawyers during their Call to the Bar ceremony in 1980, at which time he
was the treasurer of the Law Society of Upper Canada.
Please remember that you are not law professors, students of human behaviour, or social

or political scientists. You are lawyers, first and last. Your mandate is not to change the
world: yours is a much higher calling. You are charged with the defence of the freedom
26
of the Queen's subjects under the law.

Even if one is prepared to go only part way down the path of this
descriptive claim, there is ample evidence to suggest that legal education
does not prepare students to engage in the critical evaluation of existing
social, economic, political, or legal arrangements. Rather, legal
education prepares students to work within the existing order,
marginally, incrementally modifying it through litigation. A reasonable
deduction which follows is that lawyers trained in this anti-critical
educational environment are unlikely to see client problems as anything
other than individual problems, are unlikely to search for systemic
patterns of oppression, are unlikely to attempt to understand the
structural roots of client problems, are even less likely to challenge those
structures, and thus, are unlikely to practise in ways that render them
allies of social movements. In sum, anti-critical legal education is the
27
forbearer of anti-critical lawyering practices.
Second, the central message of lawyering taught through
doctrinal analysis-that the primary skill of the lawyer is the ability to
apply an existing stock of legal categories to a set of abstracted
facts--combines with the socialization process of law school, to teach

25 Halpern, supra note 23 at 388, argues that rank authoritarianism, "[f]ear, intimidation, and
psychological manipulation of a law student's sense of self is an integral part of the first year of legal
education." He characterizes law schools as "fancy trade school[s] where people do not want to
shake up the system but rather to make it within the system": ibid. at 390.
26

G.D. Finlayson, "The Lawyer As A Professional" (1980) 14 L Soc. Gaz. 229 at 235.

27

Klare, supra note 21 at 339, has argued that students:
learn that the only lawyer-like way to view the world is moderately, through the window of
moderate conservatism or liberal reformism. They learn that the only lawyer-like way to
think about social change is in terms of atomized, marginal, incremental reform through
governmental regulation of private conduct .... Finally, they learn that lawyers do not
possess intellectual skills and preoccupations appropriate to discussion and analysis of
fundamental issues of social and political organization and thoroughgoing social change
[emphasis in original].
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students to distance themselves from their clients' lives.28 This process,
its links to practice, and its harms to social movements, are vividly
captured by L6pez:
Generic legal education methodically disciplines students not to immerse themselves in
their clients' lives-to extract and attend to only that which is "legally" relevant in a
situation, to disregard what other professional and lay people maybe doing in response
to problems, to underappreciate what clients themselves may have done and may be
capable of doing. And generic legal education effectively persuades students to think of
themselves as the preeminent problem-solvers in any situation, with little to learn from
those around them-about the worlds in which lawyers intervene, about constellations of
strategies from which lawyers should be helping people to choose a course of action,
about the lasting practical effects, if any, of the lawsuits lawyers so frequently file, about
ways of reconceiving what lawyers do in the fight for social change....
What kind of collaboration with subordinated people can you reasonably expect from
lawyers systematically socialized away from subordinated communities and methodically
trained to pay as little attention to their clients as possible? And what kind of world can
you fairly hope to bring into existence through fights that almost "naturally" privilege the
narrowest sort of lawyer know-how and that regularly dismiss what subordinated people
29
(and their other allies) know about life, about problem-solving and about change itself?

Let me attempt to develop, in greater detail, how doctrinal
analysis results in the distancing of lawyers from clients' lives and the
harms which this works. Doctrinal analysis teaches students, as L6pez
argues, that answers to client problems are to be found in the application
of the proper legal category to the relevant legal facts (if you get the
right legal category and apply it appropriately the client's problem will be
solved). As only those trained in law are in a position to know which
facts are relevant and to decide which is the applicable legal category
(after all it takes years of training for lawyers to learn how to do this),
clients have little meaningful input to contribute. Immersion in the
client's life is irrelevant to the lawyering tasks at hand, thus distancing is
appropriate. The central place of doctrinal analysis in legal education
breeds the lawyer arrogance, domination, and instrumentalism-and all
of the accompanying harms to social movements-observed in the
earlier discussion of practice.
28 See "Training Future Lawyers," supra note 22 at 353. With respect to the socialization
process, L6pez observes that it runs "diametrically opposed to the needs of these future lawyers and
clients,.... Whatever else law schools may be, they remain intensely mainstream in terms of race,
gender, and class; in terms of how authority is exercised; and in terms of what counts as wisdom and
insight." Cassels & Mahoney, supra note 23 at 109, also argue that legal education legitimizes
hierarchy; that students are taught that "subordination and conformity are natural and inevitable
incidents of legal knowledge and practice."
29 "Training Future Lawyers," supra note 22 at 353-54. It is also important to note that the
distancing from client lives means that lawyers will often not serve clients well in their private quests
for relief.
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The method of doctrinal analysis also works to distance lawyers
from their clients' lives. Doctrinal analysis teaches students to box
experience into a relatively static, pre-existing set of categories (expert
needs discourse). 30 As Peter Shane explains,
[t]his impulse towards categorization-and towards the perception that categories are
oppositional or mutually exclusive ...
leads us to abstract from the accounts we receive of
other people's experiences and concerns only those details that mesh with our own
favored categories-and to insist that the proper categorization of anyone's experiences
and concerns be both singular and universally recognizable ...
31
To get other people's accounts of their experiences to fit our Procrustean categories, it is
often necessary to ignore those aspects of experience that are individual, nuanced and
unfamiliar. 32

This method of analysis, which students are pressed to acquire,
impairs their ability to hear multiplicity. Only those aspects of
experience that resonate with the stock of stories or categories that have
been etched into the vinyl recording that constitutes legal knowledge are
heard. Lawyers remain at a distance, in part, because the method of
analysis which they so routinely employ impairs their ability to hear,
even if they desired to, the full context of a client's life.33
The final point to be made about doctrinal analysis is that not
only is its method flawed (as the second critique suggests), but so too is
its content. Here, I refer not to what is excluded, as the first critique
does (the unreflective acceptance of the status quo), but of what is
included. Existing legal categories suffer from what Mari Matsuda has

30 See P. Shane, "Why are So Many People So Unhappy? Habits of Thought and Resistance
to Diversity in Legal Education" (1990) 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1033 at 1036. This form of criticism is
relevant not only to law, but really to all "disciplines." Each has its "boxes" or "categories" through
which client's or patient's lives are organized and interpreted. There is an extensive literature on
this in medicine. See, for example, C. Warshaw, "Limitations of the Medical Model in the Care of
Battered Women" (1989) 3 Gender & Soe'y 506.
31 Shane, supra note 30 at 1036.
32 Ibid. at 1039. Shane uses the term "diversity" as capturing two aspirations: to undo the
historical domination by white men; and a "solicitude for encompassing and valuing multiple
perspectives, multiple experiences, and multiple methods of teaching and doing research in the
higher education environinent": ibid. at 1037.
He also argues that a second habit of thought-the imperialist mindset-impairs lawyers'
ability to embrace the diversity aspiration. As Shane suggests, at 1048, and others confirm, lawyers
are "notoriously" imperialist in pronouncing authoritatively upon the meaning of events in other
people's lives.
33 Carol Warshaw, supra note 30, makes a similar observation in the context of medical
practice. She argues that the standard medical description format, which is itself premised on
categories of organic disease, limits the ability of physicians even to see signals of wife abuse
presented by their patients.
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described as the "apartheid" in legal knowledge. 34 As a system of
knowledge that is constructed from the inside, passed from lawyer to
lawyer wherein lawyers decide what is on the inside/out, legal knowledge
routinely fails to be informed by, and thus to reflect, the perspectives of
outsiders. 35 It is not simply then that categorization renders it difficult
to hear and assess context, but that existing categories themselves are
unlikely to "fit" the lives of the oppressed. In other words, some lives
can be made to fit (boxed into) these categories with less harm than
others. Matsuda makes explicit the implications of the apartheid in legal
knowledge for lawyering for the oppressed:
When outsiders' perspectives are ignored in legal scholarship, not only do we lose
important ideas and insights, but we also fail in our most traditional role as educators.
We fail to prepare future practitioners for effective advocacy and policy formation in a

36
world populated by women and men of differing points of view.

The failure to attend to-indeed, the rendering irrelevant
of-the voices of outsiders, other perspectives, other forms of
knowledge, other ways of doing, is an act profoundly violative of social
movement formation and mobilization. At the very core of social
movements is the challenge to existing orthodoxies. The stock of stories
upon which we trade in law routinely perpetuates, rather than
challenges, these orthodoxies. And traditional legal reasoning produces
habits of thought that limit lawyers' abilities to see that these are
orthodoxies, not "truths," and to acknowledge the harms which they
perpetuate.
Thus far, the review of legal practice and legal education
suggests that law schools not only fail to produce lawyers able to work as
allies of social movements but rather, they impart ways of lawyering that
undermine them. While the broad-brushed description thus far does, I
believe, hold true for Canadian legal education, it is also the case that
Canadian legal education has changed and is changing in ways which
34 M. Matsuda, "Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up

Ground" (1988) 11 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 at 2.
35

]bid. at 3. Dorothy Smith has described this process-one she argues is common amongst

professionals-as an "ideological circle": D.E. Smith, The Conceptual PracticesofPower: A Feminist

Sociology of Power (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) at 89-100. The failure of legal
education to attend to the voices of outsiders is an experience which women students and faculty
have often written about. The failure to include these voices-in effect, to attend to the realities of
people's lives--or the trivialization of them once raised, has the result of silencing the outsider and

thus of confirming the legitimacy of the existing stocks of knowledge. See, for example, L. Finley,
"Women's Experience in Legal Education: Silencing and Alienation" (1989) 1 Legal Educ. Rev.

101.
36

Supra note 34 at 4.
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render it potentially more responsive to social movements. 37 Let me
briefly describe some of these changes.
Most, if not all, Canadian law schools, have introduced courses
that seek to iake explicit the role of law in reproducing the oppression
of particular groups. In placing law as an object for critical reflection
about questions of power, justice, and oppression, such courses are
consistent with the aspirations of social movements. One might think
about courses on gender issues and the law as an example. Here, a law
school might claim that social movements have been heard and that the
law school has responded. I do think that such a claim correctly portrays
the nature of the causal relationship here; without women's movements,
law schools would likely never have adopted such courses.38 I also think
that these events in the life of the law school in some manner "count" as
indicia of a response to social movements. Changes to admissions
policies that are designed to attract, and the addition of support
programs that are designed to retain, more students from diverse racial,
cultural, and economic backgrounds are also probable "response"
candidates. While curriculum changes, admissions policies, and support
programs are important, one must simultaneously acknowledge that they
have not resulted in a major rethinking about the way in which law is
taught. In the main, changes in the curriculum have been at the
periphery, with little impact upon the core of legal education,
particularly the formative first year curriculum. Perhaps more
importantly, these changes have not caused most legal educators to think
critically about the vision of lawyering which they impart to students.
And my hunch is that even those legal educators who pervasively
incorporate critique rarely work with their students on the task of
translating critical perspectives on law into critical perspectives on
lawyering.
A similar observation can be made about changes to admissions
policies. The admission of greater numbers of students of diverse racial,
ethnic, and class backgrounds creates the potential to eliminate the
apartheid in legal knowledge. It seems to offer the ingredients of an
environment where students and faculty might learn about multiple ways

37

The claims made here about Canadian legal education are not based upon a detailed
empirical review, but rather upon conversations with students, legal educators, and the secondary
literature. Hence, the claims that I make, while I believe them to be generally reflective, in the
main, of Canadian legal education, may not reflect your own experience.
38 In a similar vein, Cassels & Mahoney, supra note 23 at 106, maintain that "[g]ains for
women have been achieved because of external social movements unaided in any manner by law
schools admission policies."
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of knowing, doing, and being. But for the most part this has not
materialized. Rather, women students, and students of non-dominant
ethnicities, races, and classes, have written about the experience of being
"Admitted But Not Accepted." 39 These students are permitted into the
enclave of law on the condition that they acclimatize themselves to the
status quo.40 Many newcomers have been admitted, but few have been
welcomed and, as such, law schools have failed to redefine themselves in
ways potentially responsive to a more diverse student body and to the
communities of which these students are a part. As Matsuda argues,
[a]ffirmative action, a concept we have accepted in respect to bringing new colors and
shapes of human bodies into law schools, should also apply to our primary function as
scholars: the exploration of human knowledge. The new individuals we are bringing to
the law schools also bring new ideas about law. Instead of bending their minds to

conform to the knowledge of the formerlysegregated law school, perhaps we should bend
our shared legal knowledge to accommodate new visions.

41

In sum, law schools have taken some steps-and indeed have
taken these steps in response to pressure from social
movements-towards change. But the core of legal education, and in
particular the traditional vision of lawyering which it imparts, remains
quite firmly in place. As such, there is every reason to believe that
through their educational processes, law schools will continue to yield
forth into the world lawyers who practise in ways which undermine,
rather than enhance, the emergence, flourishment, and objectives of
social movements.
At this juncture, it seems appropriate to move forward from the
debris of the critique and ask "what then is it that law schools should be
doing?" We might suppose, for a moment, that there exists a law school
which has self-consciously chosen to make the training of lawyers to
work with subordinated communities in their struggles for social
transformation part of its "mission." How might such a school begin to
make good on this commitment? In addressing this question, there
exists, I believe, a tension which needs to be explicitly acknowledged.
On the one hand, there is much to be learned from the history and
current state of legal education and legal practice in terms of what law
schools ought not to be doing. These lessons tempt one (such as myself)
towards prescriptiveness. But here arises the tension, for being bound

39 See S. Homer & L. Schwartz, "Admitted But Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an Inside Look

at Law School" (1990) 5 Berkeley Women's LJ.1.
40
Shane, supranote 30 at 1034.
41 Matsuda, supra note 34 at 2.
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to the apparent lessons of history, particularly if it is legal educators who
pronounce on the meaning and implications of that history, is
worrisome. Prescriptiveness by legal educators, in fact, simply relives a
past and a present wherein academics and practitioners are the knowers
and the doers. So as I proceed, I am conscious that I am treading on this
fine line. You must be the judge as to whether I have gone too far in
either direction.
Legal education must, in my view, embrace critique-of existing
social, economic, political, and legal orders-pervasively. This critique
however, must be informed by the insights of social movements.
Critique uninformed by social movements once again transmits a
message that it is academics, not social movements, who are the creators,
guardians, and transmitters of knowledge. Such critique also arrogantly
presupposes that academics are able to develop insightful, progressive,
useful critique without immersing themselves in the lives of the
oppressed. In my view, this is blatantly false. As Matsuda argues, we
"learn and grow through interaction with difference, not by reproducing
what [we] already know."42
Legal educators must also bring to the surface the implicit
messages about lawyering which legal education imparts. In doing so,
the notion of lawyering as the application of neutral, apolitical,
instrumental technique must be challenged, and normative visions of
lawyering explored. In this process as well, the active participation of
social movement actors is necessary. First, while I have suggested a
number of harms which I believe current legal education and legal
practices work, surely these ought not to be accepted at face value.
Rather, dialogue with social movement actors about these practices and
the lessons they may teach must be pursued. Dialogue is necessary, not
only to the telling of the history and harms of legal services and legal
education, but also to constructing visions of future practice. What
skills do lawyers need to work with subordinated communities and their
members? Surely the details of this can only be determined in
conversation with social movement actors. And because social
movements are dynamic, evolving, and constantly changing, so too, we
might expect, will be the skills required of lawyers.
Though dialogue is necessary to determine the details, at any
historical moment, of these skills and practices, I do think that some
general things can be said as to what is required on the part of lawyers. I
agree with L6pez that lawyers need to learn "how to work with clients ....
how to collaborate with allies ..., how to take advantage of and how to
42 Ibid. at 3.
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teach self-help and lay lawyering ..., how to be a part of, as well as
knowing how to build, coalitions, and not just for the purposes of filing a
lawsuit." 43 It also seems to me that we can identify certain "skills"
necessary for this meaningful and productive dialogue to occur, and
thus, skills which will be essential to a lawyering practice that is
responsive to social movements. One is the ability to listen-which
necessitates moving beyond existing categories and indeed beyond the
process of categorization itself. Another is the ability to share
power-which presupposes demystifying and de-privileging what lawyers
do. A third is a willingness to open oneself up to critical examination,
for meaningful dialogue cannot occur unless one is open to change. And
I suppose a fourth might be an active imagination.
In general, what I envision is a much more dialogic and dialectic
relationship between social movement actors and legal educators. It also
strikes me that clinical legal education (by which I mean educational
processes in which learning is derived from engagement with potential
or actual "clients," be they individuals, groups, or communities) is the
most promising vehicle through which this dialogue may occur. But
history teaches us that this is a promise only, and one not easily kept.
It is not a new idea that clinical legal education might be the
vehicle for the kind of dialogue and outcomes I have described. Indeed,
in the formative years of clinical legal education, its proponents scripted
an almost identical role. Clinical education, so the script foretold, would
immerse students in the lives of their clients. 44 Clinics would provide
opportunities for critical analysis of law's impact. 45 And clinics would
help students come to understand that lawyering is not about technique

43 "Training Future Lawyers,"supra note 22 at 356.
44 Ibid. at 339-40.
45 A number of authors have described this potential for critique in the clinic setting. See for

example, D. Barnhizer, "The University Ideal and Clinical Legal Education" (1990) 35 N.Y.L. Sch.
L. Rev. 87 at 89-90, who includes amongst the primary themes informing clinical work, "the
importance of developing and implementing practical conceptions of justice."
Similarly Cassels & Mahoney, supra note 23 at 124-25, describe clinical legal education as, "an

important ... vehicle through which a more fully integrated critique could be carried on in a
sustained manner," and wherein one is able to" ... uncover the political dimensions of law and the

pathology of dominant gender and group power." James Hathaway also characterizes clinics as
creating opportunities for students to focus on the relationship between law and justice: J.C.
Hathaway, "Clinical Legal Education" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 239.

Finally, see M.V. Tushnet, "Scenes from the Metropolitan Underground: A Critical
Perspective on the Status of Clinical Education" (1984) 52 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 272 at 278. Tushnet

maintains that "[c]linical education provides a tremendous opportunity for people to learn about
the law in action ... [to] observe the systematic methods by which institutions produce results that
are perhaps consistent with the statutes but are nonetheless unsound policy."
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(or not solely), and thus would prompt the search for normative visions
of practice. 46
But clinical legal education, so history reveals, neither necessarily
nor naturally facilitates transformative practice. In practice, clinical
legal education has often been (and continues to be) permeated by the
same vision of law and lawyering that informs classroom instruction.
Indeed, many authors have critiqued law school clinics for their failure
to reflect critically about justice or about practice norms, and for the
control and manipulation to which they routinely subject clients.4 7
Condlin sums this up well when he says:
The underlying assumptions are that there are set ways, known to experts, of performing
lawyering tasks, and that a novice's best course is to ask an expert about them. ... Other
discussion ... is about the manipulation of rules, procedures, and institutions for the
purpose of gaining an instrumental advantage against an adversary. This "ends-means"
thinking ... like any puzzle-solving, can be complicated and challenging, but it need not be
critical political thinking, and usually it is not. The assumption in "puzzle solving" is that
the structure of the puzzle is legitimate, so much so that awareness of the underlying
question of legitimacy recedes into unconsciousness.... In such a world questions about
the justice of individual outcomes will sometimes be examined ... but questions about the
justice of systemic or institutional arrangements or standard practice methodologies will
usually go begging. Ends-means thinking makes it difficult to see the forest for the trees
46 Joseph Tomain and Michael Solimine develop this claim most fully. They argue that part of
what clinical education has been about is the development of theories of lawyering "to contribute to
an active dialogue about alternative visions of law practice; and to help students develop a reflective
model of professional training and continuing legal education ...": J.P. Tomain & M.E. Solimine,
"Skills Scepticism in the Postclinic World" (1990) 40 J. Legal Educ. 307 at 310.
Robert Condlin also argues that, in theory, clinical legal education is:
concerned with understanding and evaluating the manner in which such practices [the
skills practices of lawyers] contribute to the justice of the legal system. These practices
are important because they make up the low-visibility ways in which lawyers amend,
abrogate, and enforce the law, and in the process, determine much of law's meaning for
persons who come into contact with it.
R.J. Condlin, "Tastes Great, Less Filling: The Law School Clinic and Political Critique" (1986)
36 J. Legal Educ. 45 at 47-48 [hereinafter "Tastes Great, Less Filling"].
47

Condlin also argues that clinical instructors:
teach students to manipulate and dominate others as a matter of habit. We teach these
processes not as part of a larger set of communicative practices that include ways to
cooperate and share power with others or in the context of a moral or political theory,
but as a complete repertoire of interactional skills.
R.J. Condlin, "Clinical Education in the Seventies: An Appraisal of the Decade" (1983) 33 J.
Legal Educ. 604 at 605.
Similarly Tomain & Solimine, supranote 46 at 312-17, especially at 313, conclude that clinical
education has failed by failing to go beyond technique to link means and ends and by failing to
explicitly confront questions about the role and responsibility of lawyers in search for justice.
Cassels & Mahoney, supra note 23 at 125, suggest that clinics have become a "mere adjunct to
the state" wherein students are "taught to deal with individuals on an independent and atomised
basis in the hopes of quelling instead of activating the desire for social transformation by those
whom they serve." See also Hathaway, supra note 45 at 240.
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and undercuts a lawyer's capacity for utopian thinking, an attribute one ordinarily would

think desirable in a social engineer.... Clinical teachers seem to view prevailing methods
for performing lawyer practices as received wisdom rather than data, and measure
success more by how students imitate these methods than by how they analyze them.4 8

The failure of much of clinical legal education to live up to its
professed ideals does not lead inevitably to its abandonment as a vehicle
used to enhance law schools' responsiveness to social movements. The
subversive and transformative promise of clinical legal education that
fuelled the clinical movement (itself arguably a form of social
movement) in its early days has waned but not died. In addition to the
changes described earlier that are necessary if legal education is to train
lawyers as allies of social movements, returning clinical legal education
to its roots is one of the challenges that lies ahead.

48 "Tastes Great, Less Filling," supra note 46 at 57-59.

